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1.7. AGRICULTURAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM IN UKRAINE 
 
 
Summary 
The agricultural sector of Ukraine has significant financial needs. According to different 
experts’ estimates there is agrifinance gap of USD 8.7 billion in the Ukraine. In this paper we 
will evaluate major financial intermediaries for agriculture in Ukraine. In particular, we will 
characterize the main financial institutions which supply the financial services to the 
agricultural sector; we will get an understanding of the underlying reasons of limited funding 
for agriculture. As well we will explore various performance criteria which determine the 
effectiveness of financial intermediation for agriculture such as efficient allocation of loan 
funds, interest rates on agricultural loans. 
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Introduction 
 
Agriculture plays an important role in economy of Ukraine and has the potential to 
be a source of growth in a future. Ukraine is considered as one of the countries with 
the richest natural agricultural factor endowments with long-term investment 
opportunities (Global Ag Investments, LLC 2013). The share of agriculture in gross 
domestic product of Ukraine is about 20%. The sector represents more than 20% of the 
country’s export. However, it accounted for only 5,9% loans in 2011.  
According the assessments of experts’ access to finance is a major constraint of the 
productivity and growth of agribusiness players (OECD, 2012a). Despite accounting 
for about 20% of the country’s GDP, agriculture does not receive enough loans to 
finance working capital and investment. The banks in Ukraine are reluctant to lend to 
farms and hedge themselves against risk by raising either the interest rate on loans or 
collateral requirements. As well, insufficient understanding of agricultural production 
leads banks to increase their interest rates to cover for risks they cannot properly 
assess. 
Financing the agriculture through the budget system in Ukraine has increased 
sharply over the last 10 years, but this did not lead to increasing the efficiency and the 
competitiveness of agriculture (Oliynyk, 2012a). 
Different farm organizational structures and farm sizes might affect also different 
financial systems, which are applied in agriculture. Therefore, we analyze features of 
agriculture in Ukraine in terms of their farm organizational structures, their farm size 
structures and evolution in association with development of an efficient financial 
system for multifunctional roles of agriculture and for rural development. 
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Material and methods 
 
The financial system is often defined in the literature in a narrow sense, i.e., as a set 
of financial institutions – markets and intermediaries – through which households, 
corporations and government obtain funding for their activities and invest their savings 
(Bodie and Merton 2000; Allen and Gale 2001; Hartmann et al. 2003). Some other 
(e.g., Schmidt and Hackethal 2006; Hryckiewicz, Schmidt and Tyrell 2001, 2003) 
argue that the conceptual starting points are financial decisions and activities of 
nonfinancial firms and households. From their point of view the concept of the 
financial system is a broader than previous definition. Within the financial system, 
they are considering financial relationships of households and firms that occur through 
the financial sector and outside the financial sector. Examples are real savings, self-
financing and self-insurance, and informal and direct lending and borrowing 
relationships. Financial relations of the state with other economic agents concerning to 
the flow of financial instruments on non-repayable and non-equivalent fiscal relations 
have not been considered in the concept of the financial system of a given country or 
region. 
The analysis of literature shows that the concept of the financial system is complex 
and multifaceted. Definition of the term “financial system” is often missing in 
fundamental works devoted to the study of the theory and practice of financial systems 
(Bain 1996; Buckle and Thompson 1998). 
Based on the definition of “system” as a set of any items, pieces, parts, joined by a 
common feature, the purpose, we can determine that a common feature of the elements 
of the financial system is that they provide flow of financial instruments. Under the 
elements of the financial system should be understood entities of the financial system 
that have been identified according to harmonization institutional sectors: government, 
non-financial corporations, financial corporations, households, and non-profit 
organizations. If we would like to consider the concept of the financial system 
comprehensively, we should include to the financial system the financial relations of 
the state with other economic agents concerning to flow of financial instruments on a 
non-repayable and non-equivalent basis. Therefore, the financial system is the sum of 
economic entities, which comes together in financial relations according to the flow of 
financial instruments on the equivalent and non-equivalent basis. 
Our aim is to analyze the agricultural financial system in Ukraine. We aim to 
analyze the ways in which financial relationships of farms with other economic agents 
through the financial sector as well as without financial sector on the equivalent and 
non-equivalent basis are designed and implemented. The paper contributes to the 
analyses on the ways in which farms meet their financial needs through the financial 
sector, directly with other economic agents and through the budgetary system.  
Evaluation of the financial relationships agriculture with budget system is assessed 
on the basis of the OECD indicators which are available for Ukraine. One of the most 
known is the Producer Support Estimate (PSE).  
The previous studies of investment behaviour for a sample of Ukrainian large farms 
2001–2005 provided empirical evidence for the coexistence of financial constraints 
and soft budget constraints (Zinych and Odening 2009). Credit constraints are more 
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important than soft budget constraints. Large farms’ investments significantly depend 
on financial variables in an imperfect capital market in Ukrainian agriculture. The 
presence of soft budget constraints was identified also for investment behaviour of a 
sub-sample of large non-private Ukrainian firms (Mykhayliv and Zauner 2013a, 
2013b). Distortions to incentives in Ukrainian agriculture, including for capital market, 
have been widely analysed in the literature (von Cramon-Taubadel et al. 2001, 2007). 
 
Results and discussion 
 
Farm structures and the role of agriculture in the economy 
Ukraine’s farm sector is characterized by a three-way split between tiny household 
farms, medium-sized private farms and large corporate farms. State-owned agricultural 
enterprises are not significant players. 
Table 1: Agricultural land use by categories of farms in Ukraine  
The legal 
type of 
farms 
2006 2012 
Number of 
units 
‘000 
ha % 
Average 
size (ha)
Number of 
units
‘000  
ha % 
Average 
size (ha)
Rural 
households* 15.1** 15602 37.4 1.0 14.3** 15815 38.1 1.1 
Private 
farms*** 42932 3972 9.5 93 40732 4389 10.6 108 
Private 
agricultural 
entities 
13030 16051 38.5 1232 13160 15313 36.9 1164 
State-owned 
agricultural 
enterprises 
371 1177 2.8 3173 294 963 2.3 3276 
Enterprises 
of other 
types of 
business 
1525 4874 11.7 3196 1680 5056 12.2 3010 
Total 57858**** 41676 100 − 55866**** 41536 100 − 
* Rural households, which own or use the land and their residence is registered in rural settlements.  
** The number of rural population (in million). 
*** Private farm is a form of private business of citizens with legal person's right, who has expressed 
the wish to produce commodity production, to process and sell it with purpose to gain a profit. Citizens 
carry out their activity on land plots, which were placed at their disposal for farming. 
**** the amount is without “Rural households” 
Source: SSSU (2007, 2012a, 2012b, 2013). 
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In the agricultural land use structures, there are mostly legal entities in Ukraine 
(Table 1). Their share in total agricultural land use was more 60%. However, rural 
households (family farms) have important role in agriculture in Ukraine. The share of 
this type of farms indicates their substantial importance in the Ukrainian agricultural 
land use structure, and increased from 37.4% in 2006 to 38.1% in 2012. They can be 
also important for cash-flows into rural households’ farms by sell of surpluses of 
agricultural products such as potatoes, fruit, vegetables and milk at local free-markets. 
Rural households play key role in agricultural production in Ukraine (see table 2). 
Although the share of rural households in agricultural output decreased by 12.8%, it 
remains significant and consists 49.3% in 2012. Private agricultural entities play major 
role in agricultural output as well. Increasing the percentages of private agricultural 
entities in agricultural production from 33.3% in 2006 to 49.7% in 2012 was caused 
the emergence and development of large agricultural enterprises. On average, they 
have relatively high capacity due to a vertically integrated structure and 
implementation of new technologies. As mentioned above, the state agricultural 
enterprises are minor players and they generated merely about 1.0 per cent of the 
country’s gross agricultural output in 2012. 
Table 2: Gross agricultural production, by main groups of producers 
The legal type of farms 
2006 2012 
mln. UAH percentage to total mln. UAH  
Rural households 57886.4 61.0 110172.5 49.3 
Private farms 4097.0 4.3 14111.1 6.3 
Private agricultural entities 31594.1 33.3 110905.5 49.7 
State agricultural enterprises 1317.1 1.4 2176.8 1.0 
Total 94894.6 100.0 223254.8 100.0 
Source: SSSU (2007, 2013). 
 
As can be seen from Figure 1, the average size of agricultural enterprises has 
increased between 2006 and 2012. The percentage of agricultural enterprises greater 
than 10000 ha of agricultural land use has also increased from 3.3% in 2006 to 15.3% 
in 2012. There are the four main factors, which influence on rapid increase of big 
agricultural enterprises. Firstly, the private enterprises in the agricultural sector were 
formed, which allowed to merge these forms in the holdings. Secondly, at that time 
influential and in lobbying powerful capital owners emerged in Ukraine, who aimed to 
multiply their capital in the long-term perspective. A certain number of large capital 
owners were from the food industry. They were interested in the vertical integration of 
agricultural producers to minimize costs. Thirdly, the lack of appropriate institutional 
and legal conditions for the fully-fledged agricultural land market leads to the 
opportunity to develop lease market and to lease land for low costs and, consequently, 
making the agricultural land of unlimited production resources (Oliynyk 2011a). In 
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addition, among the reasons for their rapid increase are migration of labour from rural 
areas and greater availability of land with opportunities for further large agricultural 
enterprise concentration. Finally, in privatisation of some agricultural enterprises has 
been engaged also foreign capital through stock exchange markets (Balmann et al. 
2013). Stock exchange markets are one of opportunities for access of capital, which is 
needed for investments and technological advancements of large commercial 
agricultural enterprises. 
Figure 1: Distribution of agricultural enterprises in operation by the size of agricultural 
land use in Ukraine 
 
Source: SSSU (2007, 2013). 
 
As can be seen from Table 3, the percentage of employment in agriculture in the 
Ukrainian economy decreased slightly from 17.5% in 2006 to 17.2% in 2012. This 
declined has been caused by the increasing role of the large agricultural enterprises 
(agroholdings of the average size more than 50000 ha), which have implemented new 
advanced technologies on a large-scale farms. Consequently, these large-scale 
agricultural enterprises in Ukraine have shed the labour, which has also migrated out 
of the rural areas and to abroad. On the other hand, the share of value added of 
agriculture, forestry and hunting in the gross domestic product of the Ukrainian 
economy increased from 8.6% in 2006 to 9.2% in 2012.  
Table 3: The role of agriculture, forestry and fishing in the economy of Ukraine  
  2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Value added of agriculture in 
gross domestic product (%) 8.6 7.5 7.9 8.3 8.7 9.9 9.2
Employment in agriculture in 
the economy (%) 17.5 16.6 15.7 15.5 15.3 16.7 17.2
Source: SSSU (2012b, 2013) 
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The role of the financial sector in the financing of agriculture in Ukraine 
The financial system is understood how farms meet their financial needs through 
the financial sector, directly with other economic agents and through the budgetary 
system. Thus, we analyse the main suppliers of agricultural finance. 
Except for rural households, Ukrainian farms satisfy their need for finance mainly 
through commercial banks. Other financial institutions such as credit unions, leasing 
companies, insurance companies and other financial markets play marginal role in 
funding of farms in Ukraine (Oliynyk and Oliinyk, 2013).  
According to the data presented in Figure 2, during the years 2000 - 2012 there was 
a positive tendency in the value of loans in constant prices for lending to agriculture by 
commercial banks. The value of loans at constant prices increased by 46 times and it 
was 31.9 billion UAH in 2012. The main reasons for the increase in the value of loans 
have been the introduction of the interest rate subsidy programme since 2000, the 
emergence and development of large enterprises, which have experienced relatively 
high profitability. 
On the other hand, the share of agriculture, hunting and forestry in total loan 
portfolio of banks has fluctuated during the years 2000-2012 between 3.7% in 2000 
and 7.8% in 2003. The highest share of agriculture, hunting and forestry in the 
structure of the bank loans in 2003 can be explained by significant increasing in the 
government support to agriculture through the interest rate subsidy programme from 
120 million UAH in 2002 to 326 million UAH in 2003. Since 2003, this share has 
tended to decline, particularly by the most recent economic and financial crisis.  
Figure 2: The loan portfolio of commercial banks to agriculture, hunting and forestry in 
Ukraine, in constant prices of the year 2000* 
 
*Loans deflated using price indices for industrial production (2000 = base period) 
Source: National Bank of Ukraine (2012, 2013) 
 
The interest rate subsidy programme played an important role in financing 
agricultural enterprises, especially in 2005 and 2008 (see Figure 3). Thus, during 2005-
2008 the share of preferential loans in total loans was over 50% and reached more than 
70% in 2005 and 2008. The high share of preferential loans in the portfolio shows that 
the high interest rate is the main factor that restricts access the agricultural enterprises 
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to loans. The financial crisis affected significantly the preferential loans because the 
funding from the budget decreased sharply. As a result the share of preferential loans 
was only 9.0% in 2012. 
Figure 3: The amount of bank loans granted to agricultural enterprises, including 
preferential loans, UAH million 
 
Source: Ministry of Agriculture Policy and Food of Ukraine (2001-2012) 
 
Despite significant impact of interest subsidy scheme on agriculture lending, it has 
been argued that these schemes actually create market distortions, since support is not 
allocated through a market-based mechanism but rather through direct state subsidies. 
Furthermore, these measures do not target small and medium enterprises (SMEs) and 
have very broad eligibility criteria for the right to use the program, which means that 
the actual beneficiaries are mainly large market participants (von Cramon-Taubadel et 
al., 2007). Similar findings by experts from USAID and OECD, indicating that the 
program covered a small number of farms, and the farms benefitting from the scheme 
are not necessarily credit constrained (OECD, 2012b). Generally note the following 
shortcomings of interest subsidy program (OECD, 2012b). First, eligibility criteria for 
the programme are not defined: all businesses can apply, irrespective of their size, 
turnover and the purpose of the loan. Second, subsidies have no size limit relative to 
the size of the loan. Therefore, market participants who received a large loan, receive 
large subsidies and thus it includes fewer companies. Thirdly, the application process 
is complex and lacks transparency. Fourth, banks have an incentive to raise interest 
rates for agriculture, when they know that the borrower will receive a subsidy from the 
support scheme. 
The agriculture is generally not the first priority of many commercial banks in 
Ukraine. Some banks are working with agricultural enterprises, but they clearly 
differentiate between companies according to size. Larger vertically integrated agri-
holdings are attractive clients for commercial banks as well as for international 
financial institutions such as the IFC, EBRD and others. Smaller farms and rural 
households are underrepresented in bank portfolios (EFSE, 2012). 
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Despite the large number of commercial banks in Ukraine (175 at the end of 2011), 
half of loans to agriculture are concentrated in the 10 commercial banks (Table 4). The 
largest share of the market belongs to two powerful banks in Ukraine - PrivatBank and 
UkrEximBank. Together, they hold more than 23 per cent of the total agricultural 
portfolio. Their clients are predominantly large enterprises. These two banks are 
offering wide range of products and services, but they do not have specialized products 
for agriculture. 
Table 4: Top 10 banks serving the agriculture, hunting and forestry (as outstanding 
amounts at end of 2011), UAH billion 
Bank Total loan portfolio 
Loans to agriculture, 
hunting and forestry 
The share agriculture, 
hunting and forestry 
in bank sector, % 
PrivatBank 113,5 3,4 10,0 
UkrEximBank 42,9 4,4 12,9 
Financial Initiative 9,7 2,8 8,2 
Raiffeisen Bank Aval 30,3 2,4 7,0 
Oschadbank 58,8 1 2,9 
PromInvest Bank 29,2 1 2,9 
Sberbank of Russia 15,4 0,6 1,8 
First Ukrainian 
International Bank 2,1 0,4 1,2 
Bank Forum   11,3 0,3 0,9 
Credit Agricole Bank 3,1 0,2 0,6 
Total 10 banks 316,3 16,5 48,4 
Other banks 259,2 17,6 51,6 
Total banks 575,5 34,1 100,0 
Source: annual reports of the commercial banks, 2011; National Bank of Ukraine (2012)  
 
Certain market share of agricultural lending composes the banks, which is the 
affiliates of international financial groups. These include Raiffeisen Bank Aval 
(Raiffeisen Banking Group, Austria), Bank Forum (Commerzbank, Germany), Credit 
Agricole Bank (Credit Agricole Group, France) and others. Experience the mother 
companies allows these banks to develop specialized loan products for agriculture. 
Compare the loans to agriculture with GDP in agriculture indicated (Figure 4) 
positive tendency, every year debt capacity of agriculture (calculated as the ratio the 
agricultural loans to GDP in agriculture) increases from 0,7% in 2001 to 15,8% in 
2012. Regression analysis shows the significant relation between loans and GDP in 
agriculture (Figure 5). The determination coefficient is 0,79. However, on the other 
hand tendency of the reverse index to indicator debt (Figure 6) shows that the 
effectiveness of loans decreased significantly. This is evidence about the use of loan 
deterioration, but not about the efficiency of the agricultural financial system as a 
whole.  
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Figure 4: Debt capacity of agriculture and GDP in agriculture in Ukraine 
 
Source: SSSU (2012b, 2013), National Bank of Ukraine (2012, 2013) 
 
Figure 5: Relation between loans and GDP in agriculture 
 
Source: SSSU (2012b, 2013), National Bank of Ukraine (2012, 2013) 
 
Figure 6: The effectiveness of loans (the ratio GDP in agriculture to agricultural loans) 
 
Source: SSSU (2012b, 2013), National Bank of Ukraine (2012, 2013) 
Dibrova, A. – Kukhar, O. 
 
106 
In a spite of the increasing value of loans to agriculture in  both current and constant 
prices, the agro-finance supply of about UAH 36 billion failed to meet short-term 
demands by agricultural farms, which is estimated at UAH 96 billion (EFSE 2012). 
The main obstacles of agricultural lending development in Ukraine are on the supply-
side, on the commercial banks, which are facing the lack of specialized risk assessment 
tools to be used in evaluating business strategies and loan applications of farms. Most 
of commercial banks due to the lack of understanding of the specificities of 
agricultural production and the inability to assess adequately the risks associated with 
farming activities and farmers, they resort to higher interest rates, which in turn lead to 
a reduction in the demand-side for loans by farms. On the demand-side, about 35% of 
all Ukrainian farms are trapped in a vicious circle of low solvency, low yields, low 
margins, poor management and bad economic performance with low creditworthiness 
(EFSE 2012). 
Despite the huge natural agricultural factor endowments potentials of Ukrainian 
agriculture, commercial banks are currently with their loans supply focusing only on 
the largest agribusiness players. According to the assessments by the Organisation for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD 2012a), the European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development and the World Bank (EBRD-World Bank 2009), 
access to finance is a major obstacle and constraint of agricultural productivity and 
growth of agribusiness players in Ukraine. This is particularly relevant obstacle for 
small and medium enterprises (Bojnec, Kvasha and Oliynyk 2013). 
The credit unions are small players in the credit market. They have small proportion 
in-service agribusiness. Credit unions suffered from financial crisis more than the 
banking sector as it did not receive any support from the National Bank of Ukraine or 
the Government. Credit unions had to rely on members to support their liquidity. The 
situation is complicated by the fact that in Ukraine there is no common institution for 
refinancing credit unions and commercial banks were reluctant to lend to them. As a 
result, the number of credit unions has declined from 829 in 2008 to 613 in 2011. The 
volume of loans to member credit unions has declined by almost 60% (from 5.6 UAH 
billion in 2008 to 2.2 UAH billion in 2011). The share of loans to individuals and 
private farms in the loan portfolio of credit unions was 6% in 2011, which amounted to 
44.7 million UAH, which is only 0.3% of the bank loans to agriculture in 2011. 
The development of credit unions is limited by a series of constraints. They are 
allowed to lend only to individuals and only in local currency. A further essential 
constraint is the absence of a functioning refinancing organization balancing the 
liquidity needs of credit unions. Also there is no effective mechanism to protect the 
rights of members of credit unions, including the deposit insurance system, poor 
control of credit unions and the lack of financial help by state, low level professional 
and technical equipment of the vast majority of credit unions that generates imperfect 
structure loan portfolio, policy development and management of assets and liabilities, 
the lack of implementation of new services and market instruments, the lack of a 
coherent long-term market strategy and more. 
Leasing companies are the following supplier loans for agriculture. The leasing 
business in Ukraine consist a small portion of total investments in the economy. At the 
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end of 2012, 243 leasing companies and 115 financial companies had lease agreements 
in agriculture, with a total value of 7.9 UAH billion (see Figure 7).  
The leasing agreements in agriculture is rapidly increasing from 2007 to 2012 in 
five times (see Figure 7) in despite of the financial crisis. The first reason for the 
growth in leasing is following. In recent years, commercial banks have understood the 
advantages of leasing over conventional lending and have started to actively engage in 
such activities, typically through daughter companies. The leasing companies can 
increase their portfolios rapidly whereas the banks are limited by strict reserve 
requirements. The next reasons for the growth in leasing are the improved tax 
environment and the overall economic recovery and, in particular, agriculture. The 
profitability level of agricultural enterprises has increased from 7.7% in 2008 to 16.2% 
in 2012. 
The share of agriculture in lease transactions has been growing strongly over the 
last five years, from 8% in 2007 to 19% in 2012 (see Figure 7). Agriculture was the 
second most important sector after transport.  
Figure 7: Volume of leasing operation in agriculture, 2007-2012 
 
Source: State Commission for Regulation of Financial Services Markets of Ukraine 
 
There are two state-owned leasing companies specialized in the agricultural sector – 
UkrAgroLeasing (was created in 1998) and SpetsAgroLeasing (was created in 2010). 
UkrAgroLeasing leases domestically produced machinery, as well as machinery made 
in Russia and Belarus.  
Through UkrAgroLeasing and SpetsAgroLeasing is provided the state support for 
the leasing of agricultural machinery. This support means lower payments for lessees 
and lower initial coverage requirements. For 2011, SpetsAgroLeasing and UkrAgro-
Leasing received 25 UAH million and 200 UAH million, respectively (EFSE, 2012).  
The financial intermediation in agriculture could be evaluated by criteria as efficient 
allocation of loan funds and interest rate on agricultural loans (Barry and other 2000).  
Efficiency criteria in economics specify that an optimal allocation of capital is 
characterized by equal marginal productivity of capital for all users in all geographic 
areas. Under perfect financial intermediation, two agricultural businesses producing 
the same products in different regions but having similar operations and risk 
characteristics should have similar access to loan funds and similar interest rates 
(Barry et al. 2000). 
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About the low efficiency of the allocation of loan funds in Ukraine, shows 
breakdown of loans to agriculture by region compared with gross agricultural output 
(see Figure 8). Figure shows that the regions that produce largest gross agricultural 
output are not always the leaders in obtaining loans. So, in 2011 Vinnytsia region 
produced the largest volume of gross agricultural output, but obtained less loans by 
10% compared to the Khmelnytskyi region, which produced 36% less gross 
agricultural output. 
Figure 8: Bank loans to agriculture versus gross agricultural output in 2011, UAH 
million 
 
Source: SSSU (2012b), Ministry of Agriculture Policy and Food of Ukraine (2011) 
 
About disparity in the distribution loan resources says so fact. Vinnytsia and 
Poltava regions can be considered as an area with similar natural and economic 
characteristics. Firstly, they have almost the same area of agricultural lands - about 
1900 hectares. Secondly, they have almost the same number of farms - about 2400. 
They produce almost the same amount of gross agricultural production, but the amount 
of obtained loans varies greatly from year to year. In 2010, Poltava region obtained 4 
times more loans than Vinnytsia region. In 2011, conversely, Vinnytsia region 
involved on 22% more loans than Poltava region. As well, they had not similar interest 
rates. In 2010-2011, the interest rates charged on agricultural loans by commercial 
banks in Vinnytsia region was higher on 3-4% compare with Poltava region. 
Odessa and Dnipropetrovsk regions are also with similar natural resources. These 
areas are the same size of agricultural land - about 2200 hectares, similar yearly 
average number of employees - about 37000. However, they have a different number 
of farms: in the Odessa region, there are 6731 enterprises, in the Dnepropetrovsk - 
4014 (SSSU, 2012b), indicating a greater fragmentation of agricultural production in 
the Odessa area with a large number of small and medium enterprises. Nevertheless, 
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the level of financial penetration in these areas is not identical and varied significantly. 
The level of agricultural loans in Dnipropetrovsk region is much higher (more than 
29% compared with Odessa region in 2011) and the same could be said for the gross 
agricultural output (more than 44% compared with Odessa region in 2011). This can 
be explained by the Dnepropetrovsk region has 60% more financial institutions than 
the Odessa region, while Odessa and Dnipropetrovsk regions had similar interest rates 
in 2011 (17%). 
A comparison of interest rates charged on agricultural loans and on loans to 
nonfinancial corporations over time is shown in Figure 9.  
Figure 9: Average interest rates for agriculture, compensated by the State and 
profitability level of agriculture, % 
 
Source: Bulletin of the National Bank of Ukraine (2012), The Statistical Yearbook „Agriculture of 
Ukraine” for 2006-2011, Ministry of Agriculture Policy and Food of Ukraine (2001-2011) 
 
Also included is compensation interest through support program and profitability 
level of agricultural production, serving as an indicator of efficiency of interest rate for 
agriculture. Several features are clearly evident. First, the interest rate on agricultural 
loans is higher over time than interest rate on loans to nonfinancial corporations. As 
mentioned above the banks cannot properly assess the agricultural risk because they 
understand insufficient the agricultural production and they increase their interest rates 
for farms. The second is the sharp increase in rate levels in 2008, which has been 
impacted by the recent financial crisis. The third is the high volatility of interest rate. 
The fourth is the interest rates on agricultural loans were much higher than the 
profitability level of agricultural production (exception only 2011). Even the 
compensation interest rate is not allowed to make profitable loans to agriculture in 
some years. The interest rate paid by farms was higher the profitability level of 
agricultural production mostly during 2001-2011 (see Figure 9). 
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Government support to agriculture in Ukraine 
Next step in describing the agricultural financial system for it is analysis of the 
ways in which farms meet their financial needs through budget system.  
Agriculture via its strategic role (national food security) and their characteristics 
(seasonality, long production period, depending on natural factors, etc.) in all countries 
is under the special supervision of the state, which develops special government 
support to agriculture. 
The government support to agriculture in Ukraine is realized through budgetary 
spending as well as budgetary revenue foregone (special tax regimes).  
The budgetary revenue foregone on agriculture, coming from VAT exemptions, 
remains large compared to other sectors of the economy. The major types of VAT 
expenditures are granted to agriculture:  
▪ VAT charged from sales of agricultural products remains on farm accounts to be 
used to purchase production inputs, and 
▪ VAT charged from sales of meat and dairy products is not paid to the budget by 
processing plants, but returned to primary milk and meat agricultural producers. 
The volume of government support to agriculture in Ukraine has increased by 3 
times during 2001-2012. However, in 2009-2012 the volume declined, which was due 
to the influence of the global financial crisis that has negative affected the 
development of Ukraine (sharp inflation, rapid depreciation of the national currency, 
the decline in GDP, reduction of budget expenditures etc.). 
Compare the government support to agriculture with GDP in agriculture indicated 
(Figure 10) positive tendency, except there is only 2009-2010, 2012, which was due to, 
as mentioned above, the influence of the global financial crisis. As can be seen from 
Figure 10, the share of government support in agricultural GDP increased from 2.8% 
in 2001 to 8.3% in 2012, but it is more less than in USA – 27%, EU – 45%, Japan – 
63%.  
Figure 10: Agricultural budget support and GDP in agriculture in Ukraine 
 
Source: SSSU (2013), Reports of the Accounting Chamber of Ukraine 
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Previous study (Oliynyk 2012b) showed that for middle and low support countries 
with relatively low levels of government support and few protectionist measures, 
government involvement in agriculture has little effect on the agricultural labour 
productivity. For the high support countries such as Norway, Japan, Switzerland and 
Korea the government support significantly affects the agricultural labour productivity. 
There were the budgetary spending dominated in the structure of government 
support during 2000-2008, but since 2009, the budgetary revenue foregone has begun 
to prevail that it was caused by the influence of the global financial crisis. As a result 
of special tax regimes could substantially increase financial support of agriculture, 
which is practically impossible to provide directly in budget (Kvasha and Oliynyk 
2011; Oliynyk 2011b; Oliynyk 2012a). 
Different indicators can be used to evaluate and compare the developments in 
government transfers and the distributional effects from agricultural policies (El Benni 
et al. 2012). The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
uses indicators of agricultural support, which are comparable over time and between 
countries. Among the most popular is Producer Support Estimate (PSE), which 
measures the annual monetary value of gross transfers from consumers and taxpayers 
to agricultural producers, measured at the farm-gate level, arising from policy 
measures that support agriculture, regardless of their nature, objectives or impacts on 
farm production or income. PSE values are calculated by adding to the market price 
support the value of transfers to producers from other policies (OECD 2011a). 
The publication of internationally comparable PSE figures has increased 
transparency on the nature and incidence of agricultural policies in OECD countries. In 
addition to the OECD countries, the PSEs have been also calculated for some 
emerging economies such as Brazil, China, Russia, Ukraine and South Africa. 
The PSE concept has also contributed to establishing a base for internationally 
binding commitments on domestic support measures through the Aggregate Measure 
of Support (AMS) in the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations of the World Trade 
Organization (WTO). The summary measure, the relative PSE or %PSE (expressed as 
a percentage of the gross support transfers to farmers in the value of the farmers’ gross 
receipts), is frequently cited in the international debate on agricultural policies, and 
used as a yardstick of policy “misconduct”, i.e., unfair competition with farmers in 
unsubsidizing countries (Blandford et al. 2008). 
The percentage PSE (%PSE) is often used for international comparisons. A %PSE 
of 20% means that 20% of gross farm receipts come from transfers due to policy 
measures supporting producers. A %PSE of 0% indicates that the estimated aggregate 
value of transfers to producers from consumers and taxpayers is zero. A %PSE cannot 
be higher than 100%, at which level all farm receipts come from policy measures, with 
no returns from the market (OECD 2011a). 
Figure 11 compares the %PSE between the EU and Ukraine over time. Three main 
features are clearly evident. First, the government transfers to farms in Ukraine have 
on average been relatively lower than the government transfers from consumers and 
taxpayers than for the EU’s farms. Second, there has been convergence in the %PSE as 
the government support to agriculture in the EU has declined, particularly since the EU 
enlargement from 33% in 2004 to 19% in 2012. Finally, the higher volatility in the % 
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PSE in Ukraine over time implies unsystematic government supports to agriculture 
with a lack of stability of agricultural policy in Ukraine. A substantial volatility in 
government support to agriculture in Ukraine in comparison with the EU in the case of 
Ukraine confirmed that the existence of budgetary spending and its growth cannot 
guarantee stability in government assistance to agriculture, if there are some other ad 
hoc policy measures.  
Figure 11: Percentage PSE in Ukraine and EU countries (%PSE) 
 
Source: OECD, http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=MON20113_1 
 
Figure 12 presents the composition of the PSE in Ukraine between 2000 and 2012.  
Figure 12: The structure of the PSE in Ukraine during the years 2000-2012 
 
Source: OECD, http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=MON20113_1 
 
According to this data payments based on output (mainly for livestock products) 
and input subsidies were Ukraine’s principal instruments of government support to 
agriculture, especially during the years 2007-2010, where they accounted for a slightly 
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more than 70% of the Ukrainian PSE. The bulk of this support is based on budgetary 
revenue foregone as opposed to actual budgetary spending. This is implemented 
through specific procedures to use the Value Added Tax (VAT) due from agricultural 
producers and processors as mentioned above.  
Market price support has also significantly affected the total amount of support in 
the Ukrainian PSE. Moreover, only this component has experienced negative values 
owing from lower domestic prices than global or international market prices as the 
negative impact on the PSE. Except for the 2001, 2005-2006 and 2009-2010, the 
Ukrainian domestic agricultural prices were lower than global or international market 
prices of similar products. However, the level of PSE, which adjusts market price 
support in the total amount of subsidies to farmers, shows that government was able to 
reduce the negative impact of gap of domestic and world prices by providing budget 
financing: taxation of producers occurred only in 2011, when most products negative 
market price support is not offset by quite insignificant direct payments from the 
budget. For comparison, in most other OECD countries market price support has often 
been of a positive value and in the past, before the most recent CAP reforms, 
amounted between 44 and 60% of total PSE, but has declined during the most recent 
years substantially with a shift from market price support to direct budgetary support 
to agriculture and payments for rural development. The most recent developments in 
OECD countries have been adjustments of domestic agricultural prices closer to global 
or international market prices. 
Due to the composition of PSE “Payments based on output” and “Payments based 
on input use” take significant share besides market price support (see Figure 12). 
Previously important output payments were substantially decreased due to budget 
constraints last years. Critical allocation were done in 2011; they were slightly 
increased in 2012, but amounted to 15% of their level in 2008. Another reason for the 
reduction in output payments is that in addition to actual budgetary outlays, some part 
of these payments is based on the budgetary revenue foregone. Thereby, meat and milk 
processors “re-direct” VAT due on processed products to their primary suppliers 
instead of transferring this tax to state budget. With Ukraine’s WTO accession, 
concerns emerged about the impact of this subsidy on the country’s AMS 
commitment. The previous mechanism was changed several times between 2010 and 
2012, which meant that it functioned with interruptions and uncertainty. According to 
the latest agreed procedure to be in place until 1 January 2015, dairy and meet 
processors transfer their VAT in proportions fixed foe each year to the state budget and 
to a special account they open. The part transferred to the state budget will be directed 
to new animal payments for household producers, while the part transferred to the 
processors’ special accounts will continue to be used for top-ups to producers 
delivering milk and meat (OECD, 2013).  
The share of inputs payments was significant particularly last years. The largest 
component, accounting for 86% of all inputs support in 2010-12 and the largest single 
payments in the Ukrainian PSE, is based on so-called VAT accumulation mechanism. 
Agricultural producers can accumulate the VAT due on their primary and processed 
products on a special account. Accumulated funds should be directed to cover the VAT 
on purchased inputs, while the residual sum can be used for any other production 
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purposes. Following rises in agricultural prices VAT-based transfers have been 
steadily increasing in 2010-12: from UAH 9.2 billion in 2009 to UAH 15.4 billion in 
2012. 
Other the OECD indicators of agricultural support are indicators of support estimate 
to consumers, indicators of support estimate to general services for agriculture, and 
indicators of total support estimate to agriculture (OECD, 2011a, 2011b). 
CSE is the annual monetary value of gross transfers from (to) consumers of 
agricultural commodities, measured at the farm gate level, arising from policy 
measures that support agriculture, regardless of their nature, objectives or impacts on 
consumption of farm products. The percentage CSE (%CSE) is a share of consumption 
expenditure on agricultural commodities (at farm gate prices), net of taxpayer transfers 
to consumers (OECD, 2011a). 
Figure 13 presents the structure of the CSE in Ukraine for the 2000-2012. During 
the 2001, 2005-2006, and 2008-2010, the CSE was characterized by the provision of 
support to producers just through the transfers from consumers. On the other hand, the 
2000, 2002-2004, 2007, 2011-2012, Ukrainian consumers received subsidies from 
agricultural policy transfers. Such a situation has contributed to more rapid farm 
restructuring as one of the reasons for the decline of Ukrainian farmers. Some farmers 
due to lower profitability in farming have exited from farming activities or have 
migrated from rural areas to urban areas or have migrated abroad. 
Figure 13: The CSE structure in Ukraine during 2000-2012 
 
Source: OECD, http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=MON20113_1 
 
The GSSE transfers capture payments to eligible private or public services provided 
to agriculture generally. Unlike the PSE and CSE transfers, the GSSE transfers are not 
destined to individual producers or consumers, and do not directly affect farm receipts 
(revenue) or consumption expenditure, although they may affect production or 
consumption of agricultural commodities in the longer term (OECD, 2011a). 
The composition of the GSSE transfers in Ukraine is presented in Figure 14. 
As can be seen from Figure 14, the share of budgetary payments for financing 
research and development activities and thus improving agricultural production has 
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been reduced from 20% to 9% during the 2000-2012 period. The share of the GSSE 
budgetary payments for financing agricultural training and education in Ukraine has 
taken a significant greater part in Ukraine in comparison with the EU member states. 
For example, the share of the budgetary payments to agricultural schools in Ukraine 
was between 21 and 36% during the 2000-2012 period, while in the EU member states 
only around 0.4%. 
The share of the budgetary payments for infrastructure and marketing in the EU 
member states was very high: between 33 and 70% for infrastructure and between 4 
and 12% for marketing. While in Ukraine, these components were only between 16 
and 40% and between 1 and 2%, respectively. Relatively low budgetary payments for 
financing of improvement of off-farm infrastructure and relatively low budgetary 
payments for financing of assistance to marketing and promotion of agro-food 
products lead to increased production and transportation costs and mitigate 
competitiveness of Ukrainian agro-food products on domestic and international 
markets. One of the reasons for less favourable values of market price support can be 
also insufficient funding and investments in infrastructure, marketing and promotion of 
Ukrainian agro-food products. 
Figure 14: The GSSE structure in Ukraine during the 2000-2010 
 
Source: OECD, http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=MON20113_1 
 
TSE is the annual monetary value of all gross transfers from taxpayers and 
consumers arising from policies that support agriculture, net of the associated 
budgetary receipts, regardless of their objectives and impacts on farm production and 
income, or consumption of farm products (OECD, 2011a, 2011b). The percentage TSE 
(%TSE) is calculated as a share of agricultural GDP. During 2000-2012, Ukraine has 
experienced rather unsystematic agricultural policy measures, which have caused 
significant cyclical fluctuations in the %TSE indicator (Figure 15). 
As shown in Figure 15, the %TSE for Ukraine tends to increase with substantial 
cyclical oscillations. On the other hand, the %TSE tends to decline a slightly with 
rather stable developments between the individual years. Therefore, different are 
patterns and the significant fluctuations in the TSE (%) development in Ukraine 
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compared to more stable, but declining tendency in the EU member states. Therefore, 
this support for agriculture of Ukraine differs significantly from the most recent 
developments in the EU member states. In Ukraine, the % TSE is characterized by a 
lack of stability and a steady upward trend. 
Figure 15: The percentage TSE (%TSE) in Ukraine and in the EU member states 
 
Source: OECD, http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=MON20113_1 
 
The main strategic objective of Ukraine should be development and implementation 
of long-term strategy of agricultural and rural development that would allow carrying 
out a transparent agricultural policy focusing on a greater stability and sustainability in 
competitive agricultural and rural development. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Ukraine’s farm sector is characterized by a three-way split between tiny household 
farms, medium-sized private farms and large corporate farms. 
Rural households (family farms) have important role in agriculture in Ukraine. 
Their percentage indicates substantial importance in Ukrainian agricultural land use 
structures – 38.1% in 2012. Although the share of rural households in agricultural 
output decreased by 19.2%, it remains significant and consists 49.3% in 2012. 
The second major player in agriculture are the corporate farms (private agricultural 
entities), their share in total agricultural land use was 36.9% in 2012 and their 
percentages in agricultural output increased by 49.7% in 2012. It was caused the 
emergence and development of large agricultural enterprises. 
The average size of agricultural enterprises has increased significantly last 7 years. 
The percentage of agricultural enterprises greater than 10000 ha of agricultural land 
use has increased from 3.3% in 2006 to 15.3% in 2012. 
The percentage of employment in agriculture in the Ukrainian economy decreased 
from 17.5% in 2006 to 17.2% in 2012, on the other hand, the share of value added of 
agriculture, forestry and hunting in the gross domestic product increased from 8.6% to 
9.2% during the same time. 
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The assessment of agricultural financial system implies the analyses of the ways in 
which farms meet their financial needs through the financial sector, directly with other 
economic agents and through the budgetary system. 
The commercial banks are the main financial intermediaries for agriculture in 
Ukraine. But the banks are reluctant to lend to farms because they cannot properly 
assess the risks through insufficient understanding of agricultural production. The 
banks are lending mostly larger vertically integrated large agricultural enterprises. 
Smaller farms and rural households are underrepresented in bank portfolios. The value 
of loans at constant prices increased by 46 times over the past 11 years and it was 31.9 
billion UAH in 2012. The interest subsidy scheme, which has been implemented since 
2000, played important role in agricultural lending. During 2005-2008, the share of 
preferential loans in total loans was over 50%. But the interest subsidy program has a 
number of weaknesses, which requires a review of the state support to agriculture. 
Other financial institutions such as credit unions, leasing companies, insurance 
companies and other financial markets play marginal role in funding of farms in 
Ukraine. 
The efficiency of financial intermediation in agriculture is low in Ukraine. Based on 
criteria “efficient allocation of loan funds” has been shown that regions of Ukraine 
with similar natural and economic characteristics have different access to loan funds 
and different interest rates. Interest rate on agricultural loans is high, and higher than 
the average in Ukraine, it has significant volatility. The level of agriculture 
profitability does not cover the level of interest rate. 
The volume of government support to agriculture in Ukraine has increased 
significantly by 3 times during 2001-2012. However in 2009-2012 the volume 
declined, which was due to the influence of the global financial crisis that has negative 
affected the development of Ukraine (sharp inflation, rapid depreciation of the national 
currency, the decline in GDP, reduction of budget expenditures etc.). 
Analysis of the producer support estimate in Ukraine showed that an unsuccessful 
price regulation caused the decrease to zero the producer support in 2000, 2002-2003, 
2011.  
The higher volatility in the % PSE in Ukraine over time implies unsystematic 
government supports to agriculture with a lack of stability of agricultural policy in 
Ukraine. A substantial volatility in government support to agriculture in Ukraine in 
comparison with the EU in the case of Ukraine confirmed that the existence of 
budgetary spending and its growth cannot guarantee stability in government assistance 
to agriculture, if there are some other ad hoc policy measures. 
The main strategic objective of Ukraine should be development and implementation 
of long-term strategy of agricultural and rural development that would allow carrying 
out a transparent agricultural policy focusing on a greater stability and sustainability in 
competitive agricultural and rural development. 
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